

NSC Meeting
(Exec. Committee)
7/7/69

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: SEQUOIA NSC Meeting on Vietnam

As you know, you will be meeting on the SEQUOIA this evening to discuss Vietnam with Rogers, Laird, General Wheeler, General Cushman, Mitchell and me. The following people have been advised that you may wish to call on them for a brief introduction to the subjects as listed:

State Dept. review completed

- | | | |
|------------------|---|--|
| General Cushman | - | The Current Situation in Hanoi and the Enemy Strategy. |
| General Wheeler | - | The Military Situation in South Vietnam. |
| Secretary Laird | - | Vietnamization. |
| Secretary Rogers | - | Paris Negotiations. |

OSD review completed.
RIFON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

The main issues that are likely to arise are as follows:

(1) Enemy Intentions. The lull in the fighting is continuing: there have been few enemy initiated actions in the past several days and some NVN units have moved out of the Northern provinces into NVN. Hanoi has not begun to introduce new people into the pipeline. There is general agreement that the lull stems primarily from the enemy's need to regroup and resupply and his desire to conserve manpower. It is not yet clear whether he also intends a political signal. The empty pipeline -- whatever its motive -- will mean that Hanoi soon will be forced to drastically cut back its level of operations, at least for several months, even if it starts refilling the pipeline now. CIA has concluded from the empty pipeline, the 10-Point Program and the creation of the PRG, that Hanoi has decided that the time was ripe for a period emphasizing "talk" instead of "fight" (Tab A).

Hanoi faces a dilemma with regard to inflicting casualties. The enemy wants to inflict enough U.S. casualties to keep up domestic pressure to end the war but not so many that we will halt our withdrawals. Similarly if they inflict too many casualties on ARVN we might cease our withdrawals. And the enemy wishes to conserve its own manpower. These factors may be leading Hanoi to concentrate on inflicting civilian casualties.

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There are several possible general explanations of Hanoi's recent actions:

a. Hanoi is hurting badly.

1. There is no question that Hanoi is hurting and wants to conserve manpower.
2. I doubt that Hanoi is hurting badly enough not to be able to continue and, if necessary, accentuate her military effort.
3. If we were to conclude that Hanoi was hurting badly we should keep up our military pressure and maintain our current position in Paris.

b. Hanoi is moving to a new negotiating strategy.

1. Hanoi may have concluded that reduced military operations combined with a new political strategy -- perhaps a call for a ceasefire -- is most likely to produce US concessions.
2. If we reach the judgment that this is Hanoi's intention we should keep up military pressure but modify our instructions to Gen. Abrams to reduce public criticism.
3. We should be forthcoming in Paris regarding election procedures and other concessions of high public impact.

c. Hanoi is signalling de-facto de-escalation in response to our troop withdrawals.

1. It is too soon to reach a firm judgment of whether Hanoi is signalling a move in this direction but we cannot exclude it.
2. If we were confident that this was Hanoi's intention we would want to respond by curtailing our operations in some way and accelerating withdrawals to see if a process of mutual de-facto withdrawals and de-escalation can be set into effect.

Recommendation

I believe that we need to change in some way the instructions to General Abrams. Domestic criticism will mount if we can be accused of not responding to enemy de-escalation. Moreover we cannot exclude the possibility that Hanoi is signalling a willingness to de-escalate. I have spoken to General Wheeler about providing new instructions to General Abrams but have not yet received his recommendations.

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Until you make a decision on this question I believe that we should keep open our options with the following public line:

(a) We are of course watching the situation to determine if a political signal is involved.

(b) Since General Abrams instructions are to minimize U.S. casualties, if the enemy avoids combat, casualties and the level of fighting will decline.

(c) If the lull continues this will affect our decisions on the rate of U.S. troop withdrawals.

Lodge might also be instructed to ask the other side privately and quietly about whether it intends any political signal.

(2) Vietnamization. The immediate issue which we face is the number of additional troops to be taken out this year. Secretary Laird has previously recommended the withdrawal of up to 25,000 men; Secretary Rogers has recommended the withdrawal of an additional 60,000. At this evening's meeting General Wheeler will probably support a relatively restrained rate of withdrawal. Secretary Laird, while privately prepared to support a higher figure, will probably support this cautious approach. Secretary Rogers will press for the full 60,000, with a decision to be announced now.

We should certainly move as fast as possible with Vietnamization, but we must weigh in the balance the favorable impact on the U.S. as against a possibly unfavorable one on Saigon and Hanoi. A too-rapid withdrawal might seriously shake the Thieu Government, particularly if coupled with pressure on Thieu for a political settlement. It might also create excessive optimism in the United States and make the withdrawal irreversible. An additional factor is the effect on Hanoi: the Communists probably cannot be fooled as to the rate of progress which the GVN is achieving in taking over the military burden. Hanoi's reading of the domestic U.S. political implications of an accelerated U.S. withdrawal is likely in addition to be quite accurate.

Recommendation

I believe that you should defer judgment on further withdrawals until early August. This is when you have promised another review, and, by then, the enemy intentions should be much clearer and we will have fully analyzed them. If you make a decision now, it will leak.

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(3) President Thieu's Statement. We have just received Thieu's draft (Tab B). It is forthcoming on elections but makes them conditional on mutual withdrawal. It offers full participation to the NLF in its name and participation in an election commission. It also proposes international supervision.

Secretary Rogers wishes to have much of the discussion focus on Thieu's statement and will undoubtedly talk to it in his remarks. As you know, he feels that Thieu should be very forthcoming and offer the other side a whole range of possible election alternatives, as well as an election commission and a ceasefire. He will probably urge that we go back and press Thieu to add greater detail.

I doubt that Thieu can be moved off his position without a firm U.S. guarantee that we will not withdraw our troops unless Hanoi does.

Thieu's patience with us is wearing thin. He had promised a draft outline of his statement by July 3 but delayed it after reading initial press accounts of Secretary Rogers' press conference last week. He provided the draft only after being reassured from reading the full text of the Secretary's remarks that he was not being pressured. He also appears to be reacting against jogging cables from Washington. I think we must realize that if we move too hard and too fast with Thieu we run the very serious risk of alienating him and causing his government to collapse. At the minimum we will make him uncooperative.

Recommendation

I believe that we should ease up on our pressure and see what we can make out of his present statement with minor modifications.

(4) Vietnamization and Political Settlement. Until now we proceeded on the assumption that our Vietnamization program was supporting our efforts to get a political settlement. U.S. troop withdrawals and the strengthening of ARVN was designed to press Hanoi to negotiate now before Saigon capabilities increased. These moves were also designed to reduce domestic criticism and to pressure Saigon into taking a reasonable position.

The safest course would be to proceed slowly both with Vietnamization and effort to get a political settlement. However this course might well fall between two stools causing us to lag far behind the expectations of our public opinion. We may be accused of not being forthcoming enough in Paris and not withdrawing quickly enough. I believe that we cannot accelerate both efforts.

I believe that the point is approaching where we may be forced to choose between Vietnamization and political negotiations. If we are really depending on Vietnamization and do not expect a political settlement Thieu should not be pressured to make a conciliatory political offer and to broaden his government to include neutralist elements. Such actions strengthen the belief in South Vietnam that the Thieu government will have to go and make it less likely that anti-Communist opposition groups will rally to the GVN.

If we are to concentrate on Vietnamization we should use our leverage to force changes in the ARVN command structure which General Abrams believes are critical to successful Vietnamization. Conversely if we are negotiating for a settlement we should proceed slowly with Vietnamization and use our leverage on Thieu to broaden his government and to make a forthcoming political offer.

If we do have to choose I would recommend proceeding with an accelerated Vietnamization program. However, there are several risks to this course.

1. We would still be charged with not making progress in Paris.
2. The enemy may succeed in embarrassing us by stepping up attacks on our forces keeping our casualties high, or by inflicting serious defeats on ARVN units.
3. Accelerated Vietnamization even if not accompanied by pressure on a political settlement could lead to a collapse in ARVN forces drastically reducing GVN territorial control.
4. Withdrawal, at some point becomes irreversible even if Hanoi steps up upon its efforts.
5. Hanoi may now be ready for a negotiated political settlement which would be foreclosed by our failure to exhibit greater flexibility on political issues.

Accelerating political negotiations would appear attractive if we conclude that Hanoi is ready for serious negotiations. In that case we would have either to move towards accepting a coalition government or, perhaps, proposing a ceasefire designed to lead to a formalization of the shared control of the countryside which now exists. The risks of this course are:

1. Hanoi may not be ready for serious negotiations.

2. We would have to put great pressure on Thieu which could gravely weaken the GVN for Vietnamization if negotiations fail.

3. Time may run out forcing us into ever greater concessions or a sudden major withdrawal.

4. We would have to assume responsibility for a settlement which could easily turn sour in a few years.

Tab A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
3 July 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Hanoi's Short-Term Intentions

Introduction

There has been a series of new developments in Vietnamese Communist military and political activity during the past three months or so. On the political side, the most conspicuous steps have been the ten-point program of the Liberation Front, the formation of the "provisional revolutionary government," and the apparent hardening of the Communist attitude toward talks with the GVN. On the military side, there are the absence of evidence of new infiltration inputs, the withdrawal of some logistics personnel from Laos, and the slackening of military pressures in South Vietnam. There are, in addition, less obvious signs in Communist propaganda and in captured documents that the Communists are entering a new phase of activity. This paper examines some of these developments and offers possible explanations.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and was coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.

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1. Captured enemy documents, recently taken prisoners of war [redacted] have all suggested that the Communists intend to maintain a fairly high level of offensive activity in South Vietnam at least through July. [redacted] indicate that the Communists hope to mount a higher level of military activity in July than occurred in June, and that forthcoming action will include some attacks against major urban centers, including Saigon. These same sources, however, raise the possibility that the enemy's summer offensive will be followed by a lull of indeterminate length.

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2. Despite the heavy losses taken by Communist main forces thus far this year--on a scale roughly comparable to their previously unprecedented losses during the first six months of 1968--enemy main force strength has been maintained at about the same level as at the end of 1968. This is because many of the 80,000-100,000 men placed into the infiltration pipeline late last year and early this year are still arriving in South Vietnam, generally offsetting enemy losses.

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The Infiltration Picture

3. Any judgments concerning Hanoi's short-term intentions must carefully weigh the sharp decline in evidence of North Vietnamese infiltration activity since late March. A close examination of the problem tends to rule out the possibility that changes in North Vietnamese communications or in US collection procedures have masked a continued flow of infiltration.

[redacted]

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6. Continuing study of all the evidence leads to the conclusion that there has been an almost complete standdown in the dispatch of replacement groups since late March. No regular, battalion-sized infiltration groups were observed entering the pipeline in April, only two were observed in May, and none has been observed since then. This means that the flow of North Vietnamese replacements will dry up sometime around mid-summer. It follows also that if the enemy continues to stay in the field and to take the kind of casualties he has been suffering this year, his main force strength will begin to decline rapidly during the third quarter of 1969. This probably would be the case even if infiltration were to resume immediately, because it takes from two to four months for infiltrators to make the trip from North Vietnam.

Possible Explanations for the Infiltration Cutback

7. Even if the post-March standdown on the insertion of replacement groups into the pipeline has actually been as extensive and as long-lasting as our data indicate, this development needs to be interpreted with care. There are a variety of explanations that could account for the cut-off in infiltration starts. Some are on their face unsatisfactory. For example, although North Vietnam is experiencing some manpower drain as a result of heavy casualties, it still has a large manpower pool from which it could draw more troops, if necessary. We find no reason, therefore, to believe that a manpower squeeze is by itself an adequate explanation for the infiltration lull.

8. Some other explanations are more substantial, but they still are not wholly satisfactory because they are based on the premise that the Communists are making their present moves almost exclusively for military purposes. For example, the cutback in infiltration could be explained as the result of a Communist decision to switch to a lower level of tactical activity in the South in order to conserve manpower for a long, drawn-out war. The Communists might do this by restricting their operations almost entirely to shellings, sapper attacks, and guerrilla harassments. This course has long been open to them. But the politburo probably has agreed for years that to return indefinitely to a much lower level of combat would be to admit defeat and to abandon any hope of extracting major concessions from the US at an early date. The politburo seems convinced that the primary factor that might influence the US to settle the war on acceptable terms is domestic American opinion and pressure. If this is indeed its view, and Hanoi intends to prolong the fighting, then it probably will try to keep as much military pressure on the allies as possible, and in particular to keep the rate of US casualties as high as possible. This would entail continuing Communist casualties and replacements from North Vietnam.

9. Still another possible explanation for the infiltration standdown is that Hanoi intends to change the focus of its attacks or to make some basic

redeployments of its forces. It could, for example, shift units from north to south by first reintroducing additional divisions into the northern provinces of South Vietnam and then shifting other units farther south. The North Vietnamese have held major elements of their 304th and 325th divisions just north of the DMZ for months, and these units could be shifted south without requiring an immediate flow of replacements.

10. At the moment, however, there are growing signs that the Communists may already be headed into a period of reduced military activity. A number of units have recently moved into base areas, and a few have moved out of the northern provinces and back into North Vietnam. There are mixed indications of Communist intentions in the DMZ area. So far these moves do not amount to the kind of wholesale unit withdrawals that occurred last autumn, and there is no way to predict the ultimate extent or duration of the developing trend.

The Possibility of a Prolonged Lull

11. When these current military developments, plus the infiltration cutback, are examined in the context of political developments over the last few months, it appears that North Vietnam is doing something more than simply digging in for the long haul. Hanoi's decision to cut back on infiltration probably was made this spring during the same strategy sessions that led to the ten-point program in early May and to the formation of the "provisional revolutionary government" in early June.

12. We cannot pin down precisely when these decisions were made, but they almost certainly came in the period after politburo member Le Duc Tho arrived in Hanoi from Paris on 21 February, and before 28 April when he left again. The three main indications of what happened during that period--the ten points, the PRG, and the infiltration cutback--all suggest that the politburo decided the time was growing ripe for a period emphasizing "talk" instead of "fight" in their over-all strategy.

13. The most likely interpretation of Hanoi's near-term intentions, therefore, is that sometime this summer the Communists will enter a period of reduced military activity that will be prolonged for some months. Hanoi may calculate that a hiatus in offensive activity would yield both military and political advantages. Hard-pressed Communist units would be enjoying a period of rest, while their negotiators in Paris could attempt to obtain allied political concessions and a reduction in allied military operations in South Vietnam.

14. The Communists may reason that pulling back many of their units into out-of-country sanctuaries and lowering the level of fighting would be quite effective at this time in persuading the US to take steps to end the war, perhaps more effective than simply continuing the fighting. The infiltrations cutback almost certainly was not, in itself, intended as a "signal" or designed as a move to elicit a US response. Hanoi almost certainly would not expect the US to respond to the vagaries of infiltration intelligence. It may not be aware of the precision and speed with which we measure pipeline inputs, and there are no signs that the Communists are trying to call the slowdown to our attention. Hanoi realizes, however, that as the cutback in infiltration becomes public knowledge and the level of fighting declines, there will be voices raised in the US urging a response to a so-called Communist "signal."

15. There was a prolonged military lull of this kind last year. Little infiltration occurred between August and late November, and over half of the enemy's main force units were pulled into out-of-country sanctuaries. At the same time, the Paris talks moved into the crucial stages that eventually culminated in the bombing halt. Hanoi probably assumes that its military cutback last year helped to bring about the US decision to stop the bombing. It may calculate that a similar lull now would provide a favorable climate for US concessions, as well as new opportunities to split the US and Saigon and to undermine the Thieu government.

16. The Communists would still retain the option of mounting another round of offensive activity early next year. They probably would do so if there were no curbs on allied military activities in South Vietnam and if there were insufficient movement toward a settlement they could accept. Replacement troops could be started down the trails as late as September or even October in time to be ready for another go in early 1970. That was what happened last year after the bombing halt and the subsequent deadlock in the talks. The rate of infiltration suddenly shot up to a record high in December, and many of the units that had been withdrawn from South Vietnam began moving back in preparation for the offensive that eventually was mounted in late February.

17. A variant on the possibility of a prolonged lull is that Hanoi is considering a more permanent de-escalation of the war. It might even contemplate sponsoring a call for a cease-fire later this summer. Hanoi probably would prefer that a third party issue such a call, because for the Communists to do so themselves would be taken as a sign of weakness and probably would provide a morale boost to non-Communist South Vietnamese. A Communist-backed initiative for a cease-fire, however, might seem quite attractive to Hanoi as a means of accelerating US troop withdrawals and curbing allied military operations in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese would assume that the pressures for a positive US response to a cease-fire proposal would be overwhelming and that Washington would be forced to overcome any reluctance in Saigon to such a step.

18. The Communists probably would prefer that a cease-fire follow agreement on political issues and the securing of a firm power base for the Communist apparatus in the South. But if they saw no chance for reaching agreement on such matters in the foreseeable future, they might try to use a cease-fire as a means of bringing more pressure for allied concessions. Any Communist-backed initiative for a cease-fire almost certainly would be hedged with a demand that a full allied military standdown be accompanied by assurances of freedom of movement and action for Communist political cadre. If they could obtain an arrangement of this sort, there would be unprecedented opportunities for political agitation designed to capitalize on the peace issue. Communist

efforts to undermine the Thieu government and to extract political concessions might also be enhanced if they could make continuation of a standdown in major fighting contingent on such concessions.

19. Actually, any Communist-inspired call for a cease-fire--whether enunciated by the Communists or set up for announcement by a third party--would almost certainly be part of at least a two-component package. In addition to the military and security provisions, we would expect it to contain some political gambit. This could range from a renewed demand for a coalition government to a call for some form of consultative conference in which the GVN could attend only as one participating group. We cannot predict the form of the political gambit, but we are confident that Hanoi would hold out at least a two-part package--a cease-fire plus--designed in the hope that the US would find the cease-fire offer politically impossible to turn down and the GVN would find the "plus" very difficult to accept.

Conclusion

20. In sum, whatever the other implications of current developments in South Vietnam, there is good reason to believe that Hanoi intends to move into a period of relative lull in its military action sometime this summer. It might even want to obtain a cease-fire. It also seems likely that Hanoi plans some new moves on the political front in South Vietnam and diplomatic moves in Paris to accompany the reduced level of military action. Hanoi would retain a great deal of military flexibility in such a period, and could maintain enough pressure to demonstrate that its forces in the field are capable of continuing the war unless the US agrees to a settlement acceptable to the Communists. If this course failed to produce the results the Communists desire, Hanoi could renew large-scale offensive actions, perhaps by first moving units just north of the DMZ back into South Vietnam and resuming infiltration to support longer term offensive efforts.

21. Although the Communists almost certainly have plans for prolonging the military struggle if they fail to obtain an acceptable settlement in the next few months, there is a reasonable amount of indirect evidence--including what the Communists are telling their people in South Vietnam--that Hanoi has high expectations that within a reasonably short time-frame, American domestic opposition to the war will compel the US to move in directions favorable to the Communists. If by early winter Hanoi should conclude that these expectations were not going to be realized in the foreseeable future, the strains in North Vietnam and the erosion of the Communist position in South Vietnam would enter more heavily into its calculations. In such circumstances it is at least debatable whether Hanoi would be prepared to maintain indefinitely its uncompromising stance on its present hard-line political demands.

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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1969 JUL 7 AM 8:13

NODIS/PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT CENTRAL PORTION OF ROUGH DRAFT THIEU SPEECH:
BEGIN TEXT.

1. BOTH SIDES IN THIS STRUGGLE HAVE SAID THAT THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF SVN SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES, IN A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC FASHION.
2. THE ONLY WAY FOR THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH V.N. TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION, TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AND TO DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY, IS THROUGH ELECTIONS IN WHICH THEY CAN GENUINELY EXPRESS THEIR CHOICE, FREE FROM FEAR AND COERCION.
3. UNDER THIS BASIC PRINCIPLE, TODAY I WISH TO MAKE ANOTHER OFFER TOWARD THE SOLUTION OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN SVN, AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE VN CONFLICT:
 - (1) ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND GROUPS, INCLUDING THE "NLF" WHICH IS NOW TAKING ARMS AGAINST US, CAN PARTICIPATE IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS IF THEY RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AND PLEDGE TO ACCEPT LOYALLY THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS.
 - (2) TO MAKE SURE THAT THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE CONDUCTED IN ALL FAIRNESS, AN ELECTORAL COMMISSION COULD BE SET UP, IN WHICH ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND GROUPS (INCLUDING THOSE NOW FIGHTING AGAINST US) COULD BE REPRESENTED. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION WILL ASSURE EQUAL CHANCES IN THE CAMPAIGNING TO ALL CANDIDATES. IT WILL ALSO ENABLE ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND GROUPS TO PARTICIPATE IN WATCHING THE POLLS TO SEE THAT PEOPLE VOTE ABSOLUTELY FREELY, AND IN WATCHING THE COUNTING OF THE BALLOTS TO SEE THAT THEY ARE HONESTLY COUNTED.
 - (3) AN INTERNATIONAL BODY IS TO BE ESTABLISHED TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS, TO RECEIVE COMPLAINTS, AND TO MAKE SURE THAT THE ELECTIONS ARE HELD UNDER CONDITIONS FAIR TO ALL.
 - (4) WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH THE OTHER SIDE THE TIME TABLE AND THE MODALITIES UNDER WHICH THE ELECTIONS

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-2- SAIGON 13655, JULY 7 (NODIS/PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS)

WILL BE HELD.

SUFFICIENT TIME WILL BE GIVEN FOR ADEQUATE CAMPAIGNING.

(5) THERE WILL BE NO REPRISALS OR DISCRIMINATION AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

(6) THE GVN DECLARES THAT IT WILL ABIDE BY THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS, WHATEVER THESE RESULTS MAY BE. WE CHALLENGE THE OTHER SIDE TO DECLARE THE SAME.

4. TO BE MEANINGFUL, ELECTIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED UNDER CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE CAN EXERCISE THEIR CHOICE FREE FROM FEAR AND COERCION. TO THAT EFFECT, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS MATERIALIZE PRIOR TO THE HOLDING OF THE ELECTIONS.

(1) HANOI SHOULD WITHDRAW TO NVN ITS MILITARY AND AUXILIARY FORCES AS WELL AS THE SUBVERSIVE CADRES WHICH IT HAS INTRODUCED INTO SVN IN VIOLATION OF THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT.

HANOI AND ITS AUXILIARIES SHOULD ALSO RESPECT THE NEUTRALITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, LAOS AND CAMBODIA, AND STOP USING THE TERRITORIES OF THESE COUNTRIES AS INFILTRATION ROUTES, BASES AND STAGING AREAS AGAINST THE GVN. ALLIED TROOPS IN SOUTH VN ARE TO BE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITHDRAWN.

(2) THERE SHOULD BE AN ADEQUATE MECHANISM OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION AND GUARANTEES TO MAKE SURE THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE AND AUXILIARY TROOPS ARE EFFECTIVELY WITHDRAWN BACK TO NVN, AND THERE IS NO RE-INFILTRATION AFTER THEIR WITHDRAWAL.

(3) THERE SHOULD BE AN END TO VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM THROUGHOUT SVN.

5. I RENEW THE OFFER OF PRIVATE TALKS WITH THE "NLF" WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, TO DISCUSS THE ABOVE AND ANY OTHER QUESTIONS TOWARD THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

END TEXT.

BUNKER

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